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█ Abstract Michael Gazzaniga, a prominent cognitive neuroscientist, has argued against reductionist ac-
counts of cognition. Instead, Gazzaniga defends a form of non-reductive physicalism: epistemological 
neuro-cognitive non-reductionism and ontological monist physicalism. His position is motivated by the 
theses that: (1) cognitive phenomena can be realized by multiple neural systems; (2) many outcomes of 
these systems are unpredictable; and (3) multi-level explanations are required. Epistemological neuro-
cognitive non-reductionism is presented as the most appropriate stance to account for the way in which 
phenomena should be explained in cognitive neuroscience. In this paper, I argue, however, that a recent 
form of (ontological and epistemological) neuro-cognitive reductionism, namely neo-mechanistic reduc-
tionism accounts for the arguments presented by Gazzaniga. Thus, the theory offers a more consistent 
and well-articulated view of the relationship between cognitive and neural phenomena that is specifically 
compatible with the explanatory strategies and aims of contemporary cognitive neuroscience. 
KEYWORDS: Neo-mechanistic Philosophy; Michael Gazzaniga; Non-reductionism; Reductionism; Philos-
ophy of Cognitive Neuroscience 
 
█ Riassunto L’antiriduzionismo neurocognitivo di Michael Gazzaniga e la sfida della riduzione neomeccani-
cista – Uno dei più importanti neuroscienziati dei nostri tempi, Michael Gazzaniga, si è schierato contro 
una concezione riduzionista della cognizione. Al contrario Gazzaniga difende una forma di fisicalismo 
non-riduzionistico che risulta dalla combinazione, sul piano epistemologico, di un anti-riduzionismo co-
gnitivo e, sul piano ontologico, di un monismo fisicalista. La sua posizione è motivata dalla tesi per cui (1) 
i fenomeni cognitivi possono essere realizzati da molteplici sistemi neurali; (2) molti esiti di tali sistemi 
non si possono prevedere; (3) e sono pertanto necessarie spiegazioni a livelli plurimi. La concezione pre-
sentata come più adeguata per dare conto sul piano epistemologico di come i fenomeni dovrebbero essere 
spiegati all’interno delle neuroscienze cognitive è una forma di anti-riduzionismo neuro-cognitivo. In 
questo articolo si sostiene tuttavia che una recente forma di riduzionismo neuro-cognitivo (epistemologi-
co ed ontologico) può dare conto degli argomenti presentati da Gazzaniga. Si tratta di una teoria che offre 
una interpretazione maggiormente coerente ed articolata della relazione fra fenomeni cognitivi e neurali e 
che offre un modello di spiegazione compatibile con gli scopi esplicativi delle neuroscienze cognitive con-
temporanee. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Filosofia neomeccanicista; Michael Gazzaniga; Nonriduzionismo; Riduzionismo; Filoso-
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MICHAEL GAZZANIGA IS ONE OF the most 
distinguished researchers in the contempo-
rary field of cognitive neuroscience.1 Some 
authors even consider him to be the “father” 
of this research area.2 Thanks to his numer-
ous theoretical and empirical contributions 
to the field over a span of more than fifty 
years, he has had an enormous influence on 
many significant debates, e.g. the effects of 
split-brain surgery on cognitive phenomena 
such as visual consciousness and language;3 
the relationships between the human brain 
and moral beliefs, and between neuroscience 
and ethics;4 the relation between neurosci-
ence, free will and law;5 the possible evolu-
tion of certain brain structures;6 and how the 
brain generates social beliefs.7 His theories 
are representative of many fundamental ide-
as in these areas of research.  
Gazzaniga’s important impact on the field 
is also due to the fact that he is one of the few 
contemporary cognitive neuroscientists who 
tries to explicitly and directly address the de-
bate on the so-called mind-body problem (or 
neuro-cognitive relation),8 a problem which 
tacitly underlies all discussion in cognitive 
neuroscience, since at the most fundamental 
theoretical level this discipline interrogates 
the relationship between neural systems and 
cognition.9 Indeed, this line of research is de-
scribed as a «combined study of mind and 
brain»10 whose ultimate aim is «to provide a 
brain-based account of cognition».11 A dis-
cussion of Gazzaniga’s perspective is not only 
important for understanding his particular 
position on this issue, but also for more 
broadly examining the conception of the re-
lationship between brain and cognition im-
plicit in the very structure of the neuro-
cognitive research informed by his views. 
In order to understand, characterize and 
explain cognition, a number of authors con-
sider reductive approaches attractive. From an 
ontological point of view, these approaches 
usually imply a simpler and more integrated 
(unitary) conception of the entities and the 
processes that science and philosophy investi-
gate.12 From an epistemological point of view, 
reductive approaches usually also help to ad-
vance scientific integration, avoiding gaps be-
tween scientific domains and theories.13  
However, other authors consider reduc-
tive approaches problematic especially be-
cause of their implications for the way in 
which cognitive phenomena are character-
ized and for preserving the autonomy of psy-
chological theories in the face of neuroscien-
tific theories.14 In fact, it is extremely difficult 
to pursue the reductionist ambition to inte-
grate or even to link traditional psychological 
concepts and explanations with neurophysio-
logical concepts and explanations. 
Gazzaniga belongs to a group of authors 
who expressly embrace an epistemological 
neuro-cognitive non-reductionist position. 
He suggests a version of a neuro-cognitive 
non-reductive explanation. This solution is 
purported to overcome problems with the 
neuro-cognitive epistemological reductionist 
view and to offer, at the same time, a plausi-
ble ontological and epistemological account 
of the relationship between cognition and the 
brain that is appropriate for the ultimate ex-
planatory aims of cognitive neuroscience. In 
this paper, I will examine Gazzaniga’s view 
and show that even though he attempts to 
construct an epistemological non-reductive 
account of cognition, his view is completely 
compatible with a particular kind of contem-
porary ontological and epistemological re-
ductionist position.  
I will discuss Gazzaniga’s position on re-
ducibility, as well as the reasons why he con-
siders epistemological non-reductionism to 
be the most suitable approach to explana-
tions of (human) neuro-cognitive phenome-
na. The author understands epistemological 
neuro-cognitive reductionism as intertheo-
retical relations of derivation when identity 
relations between terms are constructed. He 
claims that epistemological reduction so con-
sidered is problematic for three reasons: (1) 
cognitive phenomena are realized by multiple 
systems; (2) the outcomes of neuro-cognitive 
systems are unpredictable; and (3) multi-
level explanations are indispensable. On this 
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basis, I will show that Gazzaniga’s defense of 
the epistemological non-reductionist view is 
problematic and is actually compatible with a 
particular kind of contemporary ontological 
and epistemological neuro-cognitive reduc-
tionism. Gazzaniga believes that epistemo-
logical neuro-cognitive non-reductionism is 
the only position that can account for all 
three of these aspects. However, I argue that 
multiple realizability, unpredictability, and 
multi-level explanations, as framed by Gaz-
zaniga, can be accommodated by the neo-
mechanistic neuro-cognitive reductionist ap-
proach, which is also compatible with the ex-
planatory strategies and ultimate aims of 
contemporary cognitive neuroscience. 
 
█  Gazzaniga’s defense of non-reductionism 
 
According to Gazzaniga, evidence from 
neurologically impaired patients, especially 
split-brain patients, and recent neuroimaging 
data show that the human brain is organized 
into local circuits, specialized for specific 
functions, known as modules.15 These cir-
cuits run simultaneously in parallel, are dis-
tributed all over the brain and process differ-
ent inputs through various kinds of automat-
ic computation. These different systems con-
tain millions of networks that are connected 
to and affect each other. It is these different 
systems that implement cognitive processes.16 
Cognitive processes are thus understood as 
information processes implemented by neural 
systems; more specifically, as information 
processes realized by automatic computations.  
The same applies to those mental phe-
nomena we can consciously access, e.g. per-
ceptions, beliefs, desires, intentions etc., 
which are “enabled” individually by a num-
ber of local neural systems and subsystems.17 
Although consciousness appears to be uni-
fied, it is generated by these vastly separate 
systems. Somehow these systems are able to 
integrate and unify the information they pro-
cess and get it to the level of consciousness. 
This happens when the brain “considers” the 
information they provide to be most im-
portant at a specific moment. Thus, Gazza-
niga’s view essentially seems to be that what-
ever experience a person happens to be con-
scious of at a particular moment, this is the 
one that became dominant and got «the 
prize of conscious recognition».18 The gene-
sis of beliefs is also explained as the result of 
a brain process. More specifically, beliefs are 
said to be produced by a special module in 
the left hemisphere, called the interpreter. 
The function of this mechanism consists in 
processing all the inputs of other systems in 
the brain in order to “interpret” them, i.e. to 
create a personal, consistent narrative of our 
past (the prior actions of our nervous system). 
This system looks for patterns: it is driven to 
«seek explanations or causes for events» and 
«hypothesize about the structure of the 
world».19 It is the “interpretation” of the in-
formation made available by this brain mod-
ule that actually creates human beliefs: «[...] 
there is a system in the left hemisphere of the 
brain [...], which produces beliefs [...]».20  
The view that thinking is a form of in-
formation processing based on computations 
(on symbolic or sub-symbolic representa-
tions) provides an idea of how a purely phys-
ical system might bring about specific “cogni-
tive processes” (e.g. playing chess, recogniz-
ing faces, and reproducing basic English sen-
tences). Still, it is not quite clear how all these 
systems, which compute information auto-
matically, integrate all this information to get 
to the level of a unified conscious cognitive 
state. Above all, it is not clear how exactly we 
should understand the relationship between 
physical (neural) and human cognitive phe-
nomena in this perspective, especially when 
one considers some particular features of 
human cognitive phenomena.21 
One way to deal with the problem of how 
these phenomena are related would be to en-
dorse some kind of ontological neuro-
cognitive reductionism and maintain that all 
aspects of our human mental life can be re-
duced to physicochemical neural processes. As 
Gazzaniga acknowledges, many neuroscien-
tists endorse an ontological reductionist posi-
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tion of this kind. In their opinion, future ad-
vances in understanding how the brain works 
will «reveal all one needs to know about how 
the brain enables the mind».22 However, 
even though Gazzaniga agrees with these 
basic tenets, i.e. that we are nothing but bio-
logical machines living in a physical world,23 
he does not consider it necessary to subscribe 
to an epistemological neuro-cognitive reduc-
tionist account. Ultimately, he attempts to de-
fend a kind of ontological monist physicalism, 
but at the same time an epistemological non-
reductionist position, i.e. roughly, he believes 
that explanations of human cognitive phe-
nomena have some autonomy regarding ex-
planations for neural activity.  
Gazzaniga’s view on epistemological neu-
ro-cognitive reductionism is not entirely 
clear nor is it articulated in detail.24 However, 
he often describes this kind of reductionism 
using terms such as “derivation” or “predic-
tion”.25 Given his most frequent and clear 
characterizations of epistemological reduc-
tion and his counter-arguments against this 
reductionist position, the most plausible in-
terpretation is that Gazzaniga implicitly re-
lies on the traditional and influential theory 
of scientific reduction developed by Ernest 
Nagel.26 In this view, reductions are achieved 
by a deduction (or derivation) of a law or 
theory (T2) from a more fundamental law or 
theory (T1). The deduction provides a deduc-
tive-nomological explanation, whereby T1 
explains the phenomena explained by T2. In 
Nagel’s view, there are two kinds of theoreti-
cal scientific reduction: between theories in 
the same domain of explanation and between 
theories in different domains. The first is 
called “homogeneous” and the second “het-
erogeneous” reduction. When theories in 
play cover the same domains (are homoge-
neous), the reduction can be achieved rela-
tively easily because both theories are dealing 
with the same terms. However, when theo-
ries in play cover what appears to be different 
domains (are heterogeneous – as in the case 
of neuroscience and psychology/cognitive 
science) and use different terms, then the re-
duction is more difficult to achieve. To real-
ize a proper heterogeneous reduction follow-
ing this theory, it is necessary to establish 
“bridge principles” that make the reductive 
links between the terms possible. Nagel does 
not specify the exact nature of these princi-
ples, which could be characterized in terms of 
conditionals, bi-conditionals or identities. It is 
indeed in terms of identities (e.g. certain men-
tal states and certain neural states are identi-
cal, that is, they refer to the same thing)27 that 
Gazzaniga understands the reduction relation. 
As he maintains: «I do not think that brain-
state theorists, those neural reductionists who 
hold that every mental state is identical to 
some as-yet-undiscovered neural state, will 
ever be able to demonstrate it».28  
Gazzaniga identifies, however, three main 
difficulties involved in such epistemological 
reductions of cognitive to neural theories. 
The first difficulty is due to the argument 
from multiple realizability.29 This argument 
was initially formulated by Hilary Putnam30 
and later accepted and developed by, among 
others, Fodor.31 It is a well-known argument 
that is most commonly put forward against 
the traditional psycho-neural type identity 
theory, but which also applies to Nagel’s tra-
ditional intertheoretical reductionist ap-
proach construed by means of using type 
identity relations as bridge laws. The argu-
ment holds that the same types of cognitive 
phenomena can be realized by different types 
of physical neural systems. In this way, the 
human cognitive state of “being in pain”, for 
instance, is not necessarily identical to, let us 
say, a specific type of connection between spe-
cific types of neurons in the human brain, be-
cause it could be the case that this type of 
mental state could be realized in the brains of 
organisms that do not have this specific type 
of neural connection and yet the mental state 
of being in pain would remain the same (e.g. 
the brain of an octopus could realize the same 
pain the human brain does).32 Therefore, 
types of cognitive phenomena cannot be iden-
tical to types of neural phenomena and cannot 
be ontologically reduced to them in this way.  
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Accordingly, in Gazzaniga’s view, systems 
in the brain are «flexible and largely inde-
pendent».33 They can be changed or re-
placed, with the sole requirement that they 
be compatible with the general architecture 
of the whole greater system of which they 
form a part. For example, if a region in this 
brain is damaged, it could be replaced by an 
artificial component, as long as the new sub-
system retains the same functional role as the 
original component (having the same causal 
role, producing the same effect) and is com-
patible with the entire structure of the brain. 
And this substitution could also be made if 
the artificial part were in some respects dif-
ferent from the original subsystem, i.e. the 
original neurons and their respective connec-
tions. In this way, a mental function related 
to a specific behavior can be implemented or 
realized in many different forms and thus – 
on the basis of the argument of the multiple 
realizability – they cannot be considered as 
reducible through identities to some specific 
neural processes. This ontological point is 
not incompatible with ontological monist 
physicalism (it just leads to token-token neu-
ro-cognitive physical ontological relations), 
but it has important epistemological implica-
tions for the relations between neural and 
cognitive theories. Given the multiple real-
izability of human cognitive phenomena and 
the impossibility of constructing bridges be-
tween neural and cognitive concepts, it is also 
not possible to achieve an intertheoretical 
reduction along these lines. Thus, the multi-
ple realizability of human cognitive phenom-
ena leads to epistemological human neuro-
cognitive non-reductionism. 
The second difficulty for the epistemolog-
ical neuro-cognitive reductionist, in Gazza-
niga’s view, is the fact that the brain is a dy-
namical complex system whose effects can 
never be completely determined or predicted. 
This kind of system is defined as something 
composed by many different subsystems that 
interact. This interaction is so complex that 
it produces genuinely new properties and 
thereby states which are «greater than the 
sum of their parts»34and cannot be reduced 
to the operations of the component parts. 
According to Gazzaniga, it is a «basic prin-
ciple in experimental science» that «no 
measurement is infinitely precise», and there 
will «always [be] imprecision», therefore 
any measure will always include a «degree of 
uncertainty in the value».35 For Gazzaniga, 
such measurements are indeed impossible “in 
principle”: «Uncertainty is present because 
no matter what measuring device is used, it 
has a finite precision and, therefore, impreci-
sion, which can never be eliminated com-
pletely, even as a theoretical idea».36 And 
since the initial conditions of a system cannot 
be measured with complete accuracy, i.e. the 
initial measurement will always have a degree 
of uncertainty, the results derived from that 
measurement will also be uncertain.  
If we now apply this reasoning to the rela-
tion between neural and cognitive phenome-
na, we need to conclude, following Gazzani-
ga’s reasoning, that it is impossible to predict 
cognitive states and processes just by looking 
at physicochemical neural interactions and 
laws. Systems with great complexity in their 
organization sometimes interact in a com-
pletely different form than simpler systems 
(e.g. with nonlinear causal interactions, such 
as positive and negative feedback loops). 
These complex interactions produce new 
properties that behave in accordance with 
laws that are radically different from those 
related to the components of the complex 
system and which cannot be deduced or de-
rived from the laws associated with those 
components. This is the reason why complex 
systems are unpredictable, and therefore, ac-
cording to Gazzaniga, irreducible.37 
With this account of the nature of human 
cognitive phenomena, the author does not 
intend to give up on the monist ontological 
physicalism he endorses. Even if these new 
properties somehow emerge in whole human 
neuro-cognitive systems given the complex 
interactions between their parts, they are not 
something different from, or beyond, physi-
cal nature. No mysterious new cognitive 
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causal powers are available for these new 
cognitive capacities, states or properties. 
However, this ontological account and its 
epistemological implications compromise the 
epistemological human neuro-cognitive re-
duction, as characterized by Gazzaniga. For a 
precise derivation between laws in the two 
different domains (neural and cognitive) 
would not be possible. Such a derivation 
would not be possible because laws relating 
to the behavior of the whole system would 
not follow from the laws relating to the be-
havior of the parts taken in isolation. Given 
that there is no derivation of neural and cog-
nitive laws, there is no epistemological hu-
man neuro-cognitive reduction either. For 
Gazzaniga, a similar problem is found in the 
domain of physics, since Newton’s laws of 
classic mechanics cannot be derived from 
laws related to quantum mechanics.38 
Finally, Gazzaniga suggests that explana-
tions that span multiple levels are needed in 
order to explain how neuro-cognitive process-
es work.39 Natural phenomena are complex 
and they cannot be completely explained at a 
single level, e.g. at some fundamental physical 
level. Instead, they seem to be organized in 
many levels that go – to consider physical and 
biological descriptions only – from elementary 
particles to atoms and molecules, from mole-
cules to cells, and from unicellular organisms 
to complex multicellular organisms with com-
plex organs, like the brain. The brain itself can 
be described at different levels of organiza-
tion, e.g. at the level of molecules, neurons, 
neural connections, neural networks, neural 
systems, etc. At these various levels, there are, 
for Gazzaniga, different types of modules or 
systems, as well as different types at the same 
level. Interactions occur both intra-level i.e. 
among systems at the same level (for example, 
among neurons in the brain) and inter-level, 
i.e. among systems and their components 
(subsystems) at different levels (for example, 
among atoms or molecules and the whole 
structure of a specific neuron). 
According to Gazzaniga, reality itself is 
organized in multiple levels and this leads to 
the irreducibility of scientific explanations in 
the various sciences: we will always have mul-
tiple sciences which are largely autonomous 
from each other. In contrast with the inter-
theoretical account of scientific reduction, he 
argues that theories at a higher-level of ex-
planation cannot simply be deduced from 
theories at a lower-level of explanation (e.g. 
one cannot deduce theories based on biologi-
cal laws from theories based on chemical 
laws). There are different levels of explana-
tion, each with its particularities and rele-
vance, and one level cannot be simply logical-
ly derived from another as was hypothesized 
by advocates of intertheoretical epistemolog-
ical reductionism. This applies not only to 
biology or chemistry, but also to cognitive 
neuroscience and cognitive science. Accord-
ing to Gazzaniga, multi-level explanations as 
well as the unpredictability and multiple real-
izability of human cognitive phenomena are 
incompatible with an intertheoretical human 
neuro-cognitive reductionist framework.  
 
█  Gazzaniga’s theory as a reductionist theory 
 
In the previous section we considered why 
Gazzaniga takes epistemological neuro-
cognitive non-reductionism to be a preferable 
account to epistemological neuro-cognitive re-
ductionism. The former position, in his view, is 
consistent with: (1) the multiple realizability of 
human cognitive phenomena; (2) the unpre-
dictability of cognitive phenomena produced 
by dynamical complex neural systems; (3) a 
multi-level account of scientific explanation. 
The issue concerning his conclusion is, 
therefore, whether epistemological neuro-
cognitive reduction is necessarily jeopardized 
by multiple realizability and the unpredicta-
bility of cognitive phenomena, and also 
whether it is necessarily incompatible with 
any kind of multi-level account of cognitive 
phenomena. To address these points, we 
need to better clarify the controversial notion 
of reduction. That Gazzaniga choose to base 
his view on a critique of the intertheoretical 
Nagelian theory and psycho-neural type 
Michael Gazzaniga’s Neuro-cognitive Antireductionism  
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identity theory is reasonable to the extent 
that these theories are still highly influential 
in present debates. However, many accounts 
of reduction have been proposed in philoso-
phy of science and philosophy of mind espe-
cially since the late 1920s, and there are still 
today many intense debates about which ac-
count best describes scientific practice and the 
possible reduction of cognitive phenomena.40 
Recently, a new comprehensive theory for 
understanding scientific practice especially in 
the life sciences, including cognitive neuro-
science, has been proposed. The application 
of this theory to cognitive neuroscience pro-
vides the necessary material to counter Gaz-
zaniga’s arguments. 
This new comprehensive theory is part of 
what can be called neo-mechanist philoso-
phy,41 a new philosophical body of funda-
mental theories that have been highly influ-
ential in contemporary philosophy of science 
and are advocated by many scholars.42 A 
broadly neo-mechanist trend in philosophy 
of science gained more prominence approx-
imately in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century. It can be divided into two major 
traditions.43 The first tradition is represented 
most prominently by the works of Wesley 
Salmon44 and Phil Dowe,45 and makes use of 
the concept of mechanism primarily to dis-
cuss causation. The second tradition is repre-
sented most prominently by the works of 
William Bechtel and Robert Richardson, as 
well as Stuart Glennan, Peter Machamer, 
Lindley Darden and Carl Craver.46 These au-
thors, instead, use the notion of mechanism 
to describe how scientific explanations work, 
especially when they need to account for 
complex systems (e.g. in the biological sci-
ences). In this paper, I focus solely on the 
second tradition, which is better suited to a 
discussion of how scientific explanations in 
cognitive science and neuroscience might 
best relate to each other.  
This tradition, to the extent that it is con-
cerned with the biological sciences, can be re-
garded as providing two major theories about 
biological phenomena and scientific explana-
tions. The first theory is ontological and it 
clarifies what a complex system biological 
mechanism (CSB-mechanism) is: it can thus be 
called the mechanistic theory of biological sys-
tems (MTBS). The second theory is concerned 
with epistemology and it clarifies how expla-
nations of CSB-mechanisms should be con-
structed: it can be called a mechanistic theory 
of scientific explanations in the biological scienc-
es (MTSEBS).  
Given that neo-mechanists consider cogni-
tive neuroscience to be a biological science, 
there are also two versions of this theory ap-
plied to cognitive neuroscience. The first clari-
fies what a complex system neuro-cognitive 
mechanism (CSNC-mechanism) is: thus, it is a 
mechanistic theory of neuro-cognitive systems 
(MTNCS). The second clarifies how CSNC-
mechanisms should be explained: thus, it is a 
mechanistic theory of scientific explanations in 
cognitive neuroscience (MTSECN).47 The 
clearest and most detailed accounts related to 
cognitive neuroscience are given by William 
Bechtel and Carl Craver.48  
Bechtel and Craver make indeed a great ef-
fort to show that the classical theory of scien-
tific intertheoretical reduction proposed by 
Nagel is wrong because it relies on the deduc-
tive-nomological theory of scientific explanation 
(DNTSE),49 i.e. on the idea that something 
can be explained only if it can be deduced 
from some universal laws of nature.50 Contra-
rily, MTSEBS and thus MTSECN do not 
focus on logical deduction and universal laws, 
which are typically not useful for the concrete 
work of biologists and cognitive neuroscien-
tists. In contrast, the starting point of these 
theories is the general claim that scientists 
working in the life sciences formulate explana-
tions in terms of “mechanisms”.  
Accordingly, a mechanism, roughly put, is 
«a structure performing a function in virtue 
of its component parts, component opera-
tions, and their organization».51 The core 
idea is that mechanisms are hierarchical sys-
tems that are made of components (working 
parts) and their operations; the working 
parts perform operations and interact causal-
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ly with other parts of the mechanism. The 
general behavior of the whole system is a re-
sult of the specific organization of the com-
ponents and their interactions. A mechanistic 
explanation should describe how the orga-
nized functioning of the mechanism is re-
sponsible for the phenomenon to be ex-
plained. According to MTNCS, neuro-
cognitive complex systems, as investigated by 
cognitive neuroscience, must be understood 
as complex neural systems that process in-
formation in a particular way. Bechtel points 
out that cognitive neuroscientists «have ap-
pealed to systems-level understanding of the 
brain as providing the appropriate point of 
connection to the information processing ac-
counts advanced in psychology».52 Thus, the 
theory endorses ontological monist physical-
ism, as Gazzaniga does. Ultimately, all phe-
nomena in reality have a physical nature, in-
cluding (human) cognitive phenomena. As 
Craver and Tabery point out, many neo-
mechanists accept the «central ideas that mo-
tivate a broadly physicalist world-picture».53 
MTSECN, on the other hand, provides the 
norms for the scientific explanations of such 
neuro-cognitive complex systems.  
Bechtel confirms that «from the point of 
view of mental activity» this approach is re-
ductionist, and he calls it “mechanistic reduc-
tion”.54 The author’s mechanistic approach 
«emphasizes the need to identify all (or at 
least the major) operating parts of the mech-
anism responsible for the phenomenon of in-
terest and to understand the way they are or-
ganized and how their operations are orches-
trated to realize the phenomenon».55 Ac-
cordingly, in a mechanistic neuro-cognitive 
epistemological reduction, properly con-
structed, one must first of all describe the 
phenomenon to be explained and then local-
ize the mechanism responsible for producing 
the phenomenon. Once this is done, the pro-
cess of decomposition can start: this is aimed 
at understanding how the components work, 
how their operations are performed and how 
they are organized in order to produce the 
phenomenon. Since complex biological 
mechanisms are composed of parts and their 
organization, the decomposition of a whole 
mechanism and its explanation can span 
multiple levels. A mechanistic epistemologi-
cal neuro-cognitive reduction is achieved 
when a model of a set of mechanisms and 
their interactions at a lower-level can fully 
account for the causal processes of the whole 
mechanism at a higher-level, even when this 
whole mechanism is described with a com-
pletely different vocabulary – as long as the 
terms can be properly related. 
One of the best examples of a concrete ap-
plication of MTNCS and MTSECN to specific 
cognitive phenomena concerns memory, which 
has been traditionally an object of study in the 
field of psychology. Functional analyses of the 
memory system reveal the existence of many 
memory subsystems such as, e.g., short-term 
memory, long-term memory, phonological 
memory, visuo-spatial memory, semantic 
memory, episodic memory, etc. as well as dif-
ferent processes related to them, such as encod-
ing, storage, consolidation, retention, and re-
trieval.56 The identification of sub-functions of 
a system is the kind of work that cognitive psy-
chologists do most of the time. In mechanistic 
explanations this is called functional decompo-
sition. Due to the great complexity of the 
memory system it is more useful to seek expla-
nations for each sub-function first, and then try 
to understand how they are related considering 
the mechanism of memory as a whole.  
One of the best understood phenomena 
in the memory system is memory consolida-
tion. Roughly put, this is the phenomenon of 
transforming short-term memories (which 
are labile and easy to disrupt) into long-term 
memories, which are robust and enduring 
and permit the organism to remember im-
portant events for a longer period of time 
and modify its behavior accordingly.57 To 
explain this phenomenon, all the relevant re-
gions in the brain responsible for the func-
tions that compose the neuro-cognitive 
mechanism of memory consolidation, includ-
ing all relevant mechanistic levels of decom-
position, must be identified through the pro-
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cess of localization, i.e. all the particular 
component parts and component operations 
of the whole mechanism must be determined. 
Finally, the causal processes and causal inter-
actions within the mechanism’s functions 
need to also be understood, i.e. the general 
organization of the mechanism.  
The explanation starts at the highest level 
of the whole mechanism. At this level, it is 
necessary to correctly identify the entire neu-
ral network that is responsible for memory 
consolidation (recent studies show that this 
includes the hippocampus and other particu-
lar areas in the brain).58 Secondly, it must be 
established whether this large neural system is 
indeed all that is relevant for the explanation 
of the phenomenon. For this, techniques such 
as fMRI can be useful, since they can specify 
what regions in the brain are activated during 
the performance of a specific psychological 
task. However, a mechanistic explanation at 
this level also needs to clarify how the neural 
network encodes and decodes new memory 
episodes through information processing and 
computational operations and how these pro-
cesses produce and affect, for instance, the dif-
ferent degrees of consolidation that character-
ize the memories under investigation.  
Once this has been clarified, a second lev-
el of explanation must be provided in which 
the large neural system is decomposed into 
particular sub-neural systems localized in 
more specific regions. Here the goal is to un-
derstand the information processing and 
computational operations (e.g. spiking pat-
terns in populations of neurons) of these 
smaller neural networks and how they con-
tribute to the performance of the whole 
mechanism composed by such neural-nets.  
Moreover, a further stage of decomposi-
tion must be reached: the processes underly-
ing memory at an inter-cellular level. The ex-
planation at this particular level aims at de-
scribing the components of a particular neu-
ral network and at understanding how small 
numbers of neurons operate (for example, 
how they depolarize and fire in the process of 
propagating action potentials, or how they 
are responsible for synaptic processes, neuro-
transmitters being released, and so on). Here 
it is possible to measure the spiking rates of 
neurons, or spiking frequency and to record 
neural activity in general. There is already 
sufficient evidence to clarify, for example, the 
process of long-term potentiation (LTP). 
The process is understood as: «the persisting 
enhancement in the response of a postsynap-
tic cell to an input from a presynaptic cell 
when the postsynaptic cell has readily spiked 
after inputs from the presynaptic cell».59 
Many authors consider this process to be 
central for the consolidation of memories at 
a purely physiological level.  
Finally, the explanation can go to another 
lower mechanistic level: the intra-cellular and 
molecular level. At this level, the description 
is in terms of the activity of the relevant pro-
teins, molecules and ions, such as, for in-
stance: N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA), pro-
tein kinase A (PKA), cyclic adenosine mono-
phosphate (cAMP), α-amino-3-hydroxy-5-
methyl-4-isoxazole proprionic acid (AMPA), 
Ca2+, Na+ and K+ ions.60 These proteins 
and molecules are considered to be im-
portant for the processes of LTP, i.e. compo-
nents in the mechanism of LTP, which is a 
sub-sub-subsystem in the whole mechanism 
of memory consolidation and plays a role 
that, together with the operations happening 
at higher levels, allows for this phenomenon 
to take place. As one can see, this kind of ex-
planation «exhibits a progression from be-
havioral-level characterization of memory 
consolidation to identification of important 
components in the process at progressively 
lower levels».61 In the end, all levels are 
equally important in achieving a complete 
multilevel mechanistic explanation of the 
particular phenomenon. 
According to Bickle, some scientific ex-
periments already present evidence for estab-
lishing the connection between a molecular 
and cellular mechanism and a particular be-
havior that indicates a cognitive function, as 
in certain cases of memory consolidation.62 
In one scientific experiment, a mouse in 
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which the cellular transcription factor CREB 
was “knocked-out” had intact short-term 
memory on many rodent memory tasks, but 
showed a great decrease in memory capacity 
in comparison with the control for the long-
term memory versions of these tasks. In an-
other experiment CREB was increased in a 
small population of neurons in a manipulated 
mouse. This led to an increase of memory 
consolidation measured by fear conditioning 
behavior in the modified mice. Since CREB 
has traditionally been considered to be impli-
cated in the induction of LTP, ultimately it is 
arguably the presence of CREB that is doing 
the most central bottom-level causal work. In 
fact, CREB is part of a particular molecular 
mechanism that involves cAMP, PKA and 
CREB, which leads to LTP. Bickle claims that 
blocking any step of this mechanistic process 
«virtually eradicates memory consolidation, 
while enhancing steps can lead to faster and 
stronger consolidation».63 Thus, it is these 
smaller molecular mechanisms that, taken 
together, explain the behavior of the whole 
mechanism of memory consolidation in these 
particular cases. This kind of explanation 
supports the integration of neural hierar-
chical compositional mechanisms at different 
levels. This is the reason why it is not only 
compatible with the scientific explanations 
found in the field of cognitive neuroscience 
but it is also the most appropriate approach 
for the explanatory and integrative goals of 
the field: i.e. to integrate neural and cognitive 
scientific theories and to describe (human) 
cognitive processes through the activities of 
neural systems. However, this is also a neuro-
cognitive reductionist explanation, since the 
‘lower-level’ mechanisms and their interac-
tions at this lower-level can always account for 
the causal interactions of “higher-level” mech-
anisms. Lower-level neuro-cognitive mecha-
nistic models can completely account for the 
causal explanation described (in different 
terms) by neuro-cognitive mechanistic models 
at a higher-level. Thus, there is a mechanistic 
epistemological neuro-cognitive reduction. 
This neuro-cognitive mechanistic onto-
logical and epistemological reductive frame-
work is able to respond to all the three ex-
planatory requirements that Gazzaniga 
points out. Firstly, mechanistic epistemologi-
cal neuro-cognitive reduction provides an 
answer for the multiple realizability of cogni-
tive phenomena, as framed by Gazzaniga.64 
More particularly, the mechanistic theory 
applied to cognitive neuroscience avoids the 
general problem of multiple realizability of 
cognitive phenomena because it neutralizes 
the argument, as provided by the author. In 
Bechtel’s view, evidence from neuroscience 
(comparative studies with brain-damaged 
animals, PET and fMRI) shows that there are 
many relevant similarities in brain areas 
across species; he argues that if mental states 
were described in terms as fine-grained as 
those used to describe neural states (e.g. if we 
hypothesize that a specific neural mechanism 
produces a specific state of pain, rather than 
pain in general), the multiple realizability of 
cognitive phenomena becomes less plausi-
ble.65 A single neuro-cognitive mechanism 
responsible for producing a specific cognitive 
state (e.g. a human pain state, or a dog pain 
state), with all its particularities, can be local-
ized; hence, local reductions through (heuris-
tic) identity relations (involving more 
equivalently grained states) are plausible. In 
other words, as Bechtel points out, if one uses 
the same standards of typing for cognitive 
and neural phenomena, in terms of fine and 
coarse grain, then «types might range across 
species and enable scientists to claim that the 
same type of mechanism in different species 
produces the same type of [cognitive] phe-
nomena».66 In this sense, it may be possible 
to establish reductive identity relations: 
«Type identity claims are core to the prac-
tice of mechanistic explanation in biology 
[and cognitive neuroscience] and are not 
jeopardized by the philosophical claims of 
multiple realization».67 Since cognitive func-
tions and processes can thus be identified 
with functions and processes of neural mech-
anisms, there can be epistemological neuro-
cognitive reduction between cognitive theo-
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ries and models of cognitive systems and 
neuroscientific theories and models of neural 
mechanisms. This is an argument in contrast 
with Gazzaniga’s view that neuro-cognitive 
type identities cannot be established at all. 
Since in some particular cases, for some par-
ticular neuro-cognitive processes, identities 
are arguably plausible, as in some particular 
cases of memory consolidation,68 Gazzaniga’s 
point is misleading. Thus, Bechtel’s approach 
remains more plausible than Gazzaniga’s, 
even if the general issue of multiple realiza-
bility is still quite controversial. 
The second argument raised by Gazzani-
ga against neuro-cognitive epistemological 
reductionism is concerned with the idea that 
this kind of reduction necessarily implies 
predictability.69 In his line of reasoning, if 
one has all the relevant knowledge of the el-
ements in the deduction of a certain behav-
ior, s/he must be able to anticipate (predict) 
all the aspects of this behavior; in the same 
way that Newton’s classical laws of mechan-
ics and his universal law of gravitation or 
Einstein’s theory of general relativity can, 
with a high level of precision, predict the mo-
tion of the planets. However, since the theory 
of mechanistic neuro-cognitive epistemolog-
ical reduction does not require logical deduc-
tion from fundamental to less fundamental 
laws and their related properties, nor the 
kind of high level predictability that results 
from this, it is compatible with a high degree 
of indetermination. In other words, with re-
spect to mechanistic theory it is irrelevant if 
at a certain time an event or a set of events 
occur that cannot be deduced or predicted 
with great accuracy by these related theories 
on the basis of the initial state of the system 
due to the inaccuracy of measures taken at 
the start or given the complexity of the rela-
tions between its parts. What really matters 
for a mechanistic epistemological neuro-
cognitive reduction is whether it is possible 
to describe these properties in causal, func-
tional, computational, neural or any other 
mechanistic physical language – and then to 
identify these mechanisms and their compo-
nents as far as possible (i.e. at least the most 
relevant ones that contribute causally to a 
given effect), ultimately producing a scien-
tific theory to account for them at a lower-
level. This does not mean that the mechanistic 
theory gives up on predictability once and for 
all. It simply accounts for the fact that the 
more dynamical and complex a system is, the 
less its outcomes will be predictable. As the 
examples of particular kinds of memory con-
solidation given by Bickle show,70 descriptions 
of the behavior produced by the lower-level 
molecular mechanisms are responsible for the 
explanation of the causal effects of the whole 
higher-level mechanism, even though there is 
no deduction or laws involved. 
Concerning the last argument developed 
by Gazzaniga, it is not even clear that Nagel’s 
theory cannot account for multiple levels of 
scientific explanation. Nagel intended to de-
velop a theory to integrate scientific activity 
and, thus, relate all the domains of science 
having physics as its basis. However, Nagel 
had a very particular notion of reduction in 
mind. He was concerned with theories in a 
given scientific domain and across scientific 
domains. Theories in his view were construct-
ed as a set of laws and statements about reali-
ty. Nagel does not assert in his major work 
that classic physics should literally reductively 
explain biological phenomena or psychologi-
cal phenomena. Even though he argued for 
scientific reduction across all of the sciences, 
his view appears to still be compatible with an 
account of multiple levels of natural phenom-
ena and scientific domains, as long as these 
levels are properly related. But leaving aside 
this issue with respect to Nagel, the mechanis-
tic theory applied to cognitive neuroscience is 
built on the idea that we need to rely on dif-
ferent hierarchical “levels of explanation”.71 
According to Machamer, Darden and Craver, 
the main interest of neo-mechanists is a multi-
level explanation since the life sciences have 
per se a multilevel character. «It is the integra-
tion of different levels into productive rela-
tions that renders the phenomenon intelligible 
and thereby explains it».72 However, when 
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lower-levels can account for the causal pro-
cesses of higher-levels in a given neuro-
cognitive complex mechanism, mechanistic 
scientific explanations in cognitive neurosci-
ence become epistemologically reductive, even 
though higher-level explanations are still ac-
cepted as adequate descriptions of the phe-
nomena in a different language. 
Therefore, Gazzaniga’s view is entirely 
compatible with a particular form of neuro-
cognitive ontological and epistemological re-
ductionism, namely neo-mechanistic neuro-
cognitive reductionism. Gazzaniga’s view 
concerning neuro-cognitive phenomena and 
related explanations is thus misleading. Be-
cause of this, MTNCS and MTSECN pro-
vide a more consistent and coherent view for 
the contemporary field of cognitive neurosci-
ence, given that these theories are compatible 
with the explanatory strategies and ultimate 
explanatory aims of this scientific domain. 
 
█  Concluding remarks 
 
Gazzaniga deserves credit for many ad-
vances in our understanding of how particular 
brain mechanisms operate; more importantly, 
he is one of the most significant pioneers in 
the field of cognitive neuroscience, and a lead-
ing scientist interested in research about the 
neuro-cognitive relation. In his attempt to 
construct a more systematic theory about the 
relationship between human brain and cogni-
tion based on his achievements and more gen-
erally on some of the achievements of cogni-
tive neuroscience, he comes to the broad con-
clusion that any epistemological reductionist 
account concerning explanations of human 
cognition must be rejected. In his view, epis-
temological neuro-cognitive reductionism is 
incompatible with the multiple realizability 
and unpredictability of human cognitive phe-
nomena and also with the idea that explana-
tions in neuro-cognitive sciences are intrinsi-
cally multi-level. 
However, to argue for epistemological 
neuro-cognitive non-reductionism on these 
general grounds turns out to be misleading. 
As I show in this paper, recent neo-
mechanistic theories are able to account for 
these arguments, as framed by Gazzaniga, 
and still offer a robust form of ontological 
and epistemological neuro-cognitive reduc-
tion. Thus, this form of reduction is perfectly 
in line with Gazzaniga’s view on human cog-
nition. More importantly, this theory has the 
additional advantage of providing the most 
accurate description so far of the kind of sci-
entific explanations constructed in contem-
porary cognitive neuroscience, thereby offer-
ing foundational support for its explanatory 
aims. Therefore, Gazzaniga’s claim that un-
derstanding the relation between neurologi-
cal and cognitive processes in human cogni-
tion means relying on a non-reductive expla-
nation is untenable. On the contrary, the ap-
proach that appears to be most compatible 
with the explanatory aims and strategies of 
contemporary cognitive neuroscience is the 
neo-mechanist ontological and epistemologi-
cal neuro-cognitive reductionist account.  
It is important to emphasize that this 
analysis does not intend to provide a defense 
of MTCNS and MTSECN. Indeed, these 
theories have many limitations that could not 
be addressed in this paper.73 The point of the 
present work is solely to argue that, given the 
general ontological monist physicalist fra-
mework that Gazzaniga accepts and the ar-
guments against epistemological (human) 
neuro-cognitive reductionism that he pro-
vides, his positions on the epistemological 
irreducibility of human cognitive phenomena 
do not hold up. Accordingly, this paper at-
tempts to offer a genuine contribution to de-
bates concerning the plausibility of funda-
mental theories of cognition and neuro-
cognitive integration in cognitive neurosci-
ence. 
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